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THE SURROGATE MOTHER CONTRACT: IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF SOCIETY?
Audrey Wolfson Latourette*
Mary Beth Whitehead is a "factor for conception and gestation that
the [Stern] couple lacks." Surrogates serve as "alternative reproduc-
tive methods."
The Honorable Harvey R. Sorkow, Trial Judge, Superior Court of
New Jersey, Chancery Division, In the Matter of Baby M
Mary Beth Whitehead is a "surrogate uterus."
Dr. Lee Salk, Expert witness for the Sterns, In the Matter of Baby
M
"Oh what a power is motherhood, possessing/A potent spell. All
women alike/Fight fiercely for a child."
Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 1987, Judge Harvey R. Sorkow upheld, for the
first time, the validity of a surrogate mother-contract in his deci-
sion, In the Matter of Baby M. 1 In broad and sweeping language,
the judge deemed the contract between the natural mother, Mary
Beth Whitehead, (termed the surrogate, pursuant to the contract
language) and the natural father, William Stern, specifically en-
forceable. Judge Sorkow thus terminated Whitehead's parental
rights to the child she bore and permanently denied her claims for
future custody or future visitation. Creating new law, the judge
held that baby selling and adoption laws do not pertain to surro-
gacy contracts and that such agreements are not in contravention
* Professor of Law, Stockton State College; B.A., 1968, Rutgers University-Camden;
M.A., 1971, Glassboro State College; J.D., 1975, Temple University School of Law.
1. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J.
396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
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of the public policy of New Jersey. Enforcing the surrogate con-
tract, the judge utilized a hybrid standard incorporating traditional
contract analysis (the two parties voluntarily entered the agree-
ment and were to receive consideration involving $10,000 for
Whitehead and the services of carrying and bearing a child for
Stern) with a test determining the best interests of the child, the
latter of which is routinely applied in traditional custody cases.
The case arose when Whitehead decided to keep the baby at birth
and refused the $10,000. Deciding Whitehead could not renege on
the bargain, the judge found that Stern's right to procreate
noncoitally was protected under the fourteenth amendment's guar-
antees of privacy and equal protection; Whitehead's concomitant
right to raise her child was denied.
The breadth and novelty of the Baby M decision, the reliance on
the "best interests" standard and the immediate termination of
Whitehead's parental rights ensured in depth legal scrutiny from
the New Jersey Supreme Court. In a ninety-five page unanimous
ruling issued on February 3, 1988, the court leveled a sustained
and withering attack on surrogate parenting and held the surrogate
contract invalid as violative of both the statutory law and public
policy of New Jersey and restored the surrogate mother's parental
rights.2 The justices condemned surrogate parenting as illegal baby
selling which was "perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to
women."3 In an eloquent opinion written by Chief Justice Robert
N. Wilentz, the court was also equally critical of the handling of
the case and its parties by the trial judge. The court was particu-
larly sympathetic toward Mary Beth Whitehead. Although the
court opined it was not illegal for a woman to volunteer to serve as
a surrogate, she must do so without payment, and must be given
the right to change her mind after the birth and to assert her pa-
rental rights. The court refrained from finding a constitutional
prohibition against surrogacy, thus allowing the possibility for the
legislature to render the practice legal.
Notwithstanding the New Jersey Supreme Court's relentless at-
tack on commercial surrogate parenting, the legal debate as to such
arrangements continues. The question of whether adoption law
should properly govern surrogacy contracts was debated at length
during the 1988 American Bar Association's National Conference
2. In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
3. Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
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on Birth, Death, and Law in Philadelphia, held subsequent to the
New Jersey Supreme Court decision. Further, the Association has
adopted model legislation which offers the options of regulating
surrogate agreements or rendering them void. Moreover, the Baby
M decisions have spurred legislative activity in a number of states,
such as Nebraska, which sought to render all surrogacy contracts
void, and New York, which sought to regulate and enforce surro-
gate contracts. It is clear that all possible legislative solutions will
confront constitutional challenges by opponents or proponents of
surrogacy. Justice Robert L. Clifford of the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated in his questioning of the Sterns' attorney that the va-
lidity of surrogate contracts and the concomitant loss of maternal
rights is truly "an important, basic, arguably fundamental, cosmic
issue."'4 It is an issue which appears to cloud the traditional politi-
cal and ideological divisions found in society. Positions of
lawmakers appear to be formulated on the basis of the dictates of
their individual ethical standards rather than on the stance of a
particular party. It is an issue which has gained unusual allies;
both renowned feminists and religious groups filed amicus, or
friend of the court, briefs in opposition to surrogacy.
The purpose of this article is to engage in a broad based compre-
hensive analysis of the legal and ethical questions raised by the
surrogate mother contract. The article will first review the facts of
the Baby M case and the significant aspects of both the trial
court's and New Jersey Supreme Court's opinions. The impact of
the Baby M decision will be assessed with respect to the posture
adopted by the American Bar Association, other states' case law
and legislative enactments, and the decisional and statutory re-
sponses of other countries. A historical analysis of surrogacy and
the development of a mother's right to the custody and compan-
ionship of her child will then be discussed. Finally, a survey of the
additional arguments which have been raised in opposition to the
surrogate mother contract will be reviewed. Most importantly, the
purpose of this article is to address the numerous legal and ethical
issues raised by the surrogate mother contract and to provide per-
suasive argument for courts, legislators and commentators who will
consider whether to permit or prohibit the practice of surrogacy, to
regard such contracts as voidable, or to flatly ban them as void on
the basis that such contracts are inimical to the best interests of
both the child and society.
4. Sherman, N.J. High Court Faces Solomonic Baby M Choice, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 28, 1987,
at 8, col. 3.
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II. BABY M
A. Facts of the Baby M Case
On February 6, 1985, William Stern5 with Mary Beth and Rich-
ard Whitehead entered into a Surrogate Parenting Agreement6
prepared by the Infertility Center of New York.7 Pursuant to that
agreement, Mary Beth, the surrogate mother,' would be artificially
inseminated with Mr. Stern's sperm, carry the child to term, and
relinquish the child to the Sterns after giving birth. She agreed not
to form a parent-child relationship with any child she might con-
ceive. Further, she would permit a termination of her parental
rights, thus allowing Mrs. Stern to adopt the child and the Sterns
to have sole custody of the child. Mr. Whitehead promised to do
what was required to rebut the presumption of paternity under the
Parentage Act.' In exchange, the Whiteheads would be paid
$10,000 for Mary Beth's services, plus expenses. The agreement
stated that its sole purpose was to enable William Stern and his
5. Baby M, 109 N.J. at -, 537 A.2d at 1269 (1988). As observed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, Mrs. Stern was a nonparty to the surrogate parenting agreement "presuma-
bly ... to avoid the application of the baby-selling statute to this arrangement." Id. at 412,
537 A.2d at 1235. Section 9:3-54 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes provides that no person
shall pay, give or agree to give any money in connection with a placement for adoptions,
except for fees of an approved agency or for medical and hospital expenses related to the
birth or illness of the child.
6. See Surrogate Parenting Agreement, set forth as Appendix A in Baby M, 109 N.J. at
470-74, 537 A.2d at 1265-69.
7. The Infertility Center of New York (ICNY) is a private for profit business which was
founded by Noel Keane, a Michigan attorney and the self-proclaimed father of surrogate
motherhood. See N. KEANE & D. BREo, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 27 (1981). In a separate
contract, Mr. Stern agreed to pay $7500 to ICNY. In exchange, ICNY would bring the surro-
gate mother and the infertile couple together, conduct evaluations of the surrogate by its
professionals, prepare the agreement and provide legal counsel selected by ICNY. Further,
ICNY agreed to arrange the insemination and the legal proceedings that would terminate
the surrogate mother's rights and grant adoption to the wife. See Agreement, set forth as
Appendix B in Baby M, 109 N.J. at 476-78, 537 A.2d at 1271-73.
8. As observed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, a woman in the position of Mary Beth
Whitehead, the natural mother, is "inappropriately called the 'surrogate mother.' "Baby M,
109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234. As argued by Harold J. Cassidy, attorney for the White-
heads, such a term is a denigration of her role, inasmuch as the child was conceived with her
ovum, and she carried and gave birth to the child. Cassidy correctly suggests that it is Mrs.
Stern who sought to become the surrogate. See Brief for Appellant, at 2 n.2 in Baby M, 109
N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-43(a)(1)-44(a) (West Supp. 1990) states that where a married
woman, with the consent of her husband, is artificially inseminated with another's sperm,
the husband will be deemed the parent of the resulting child.
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infertile wife to have a child biologically related to Mr. Stern.10
The contract imposed many other obligations and restrictions
upon Mary Beth, including undergoing medical and psychological
evaluations. The psychological assessment indicated that Mary
Beth might experience difficulty in relinquishing her child and sug-
gested that further inquiry with respect to this issue be conducted;
Whitehead, however, was merely informed she had passed psycho-
logical scrutiny.1 Mary Beth was required to undergo amni-
ocentesis and was prohibited from obtaining an abortion if the fe-
tus was deemed genetically or congenitally defective, unless Mr.
Stern demanded otherwise. The Whiteheads assumed all risks as-
sociated with conception, pregnancy and childbirth, and their com-
pensation was structured to reflect those risks. Thus, if a miscar-
riage were suffered prior to the fourth month, no money would be
received; the occurrence of a miscarriage subsequent to the fourth
month, the death of the child, or the stillborn birth of the child
would reduce the compensation to $1,000.12 The sole legal consul-
tation the Whiteheads received with respect to the surrogate agree-
ment was a one hour review of the contract terms conducted by an
attorney who had an agreement with the. Infertility Center to act
as counsel for surrogate candidates.' 3
During the birth of the baby on March 27, 1986, Mary Beth de-
cided she could not give up her child."4 She made her acute dis-
tress known to the Sterns, but did relinquish the child to them on
March 30, 1986, notwithstanding her "powerful inclinations to the
contrary.' 1 5 That evening Mary Beth became deeply disturbed,
10. Mrs. Stem was not, in fact, infertile. She and Mr. Stern believed that she might have
multiple sclerosis and that a pregnancy might precipitate serious debilitation. Medical au-
thorities contacted subsequent to the commencement of litigation assessed the risk as mini-
mal. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1235.
11. Id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1247-48. The psychological report observed that Whitehead
"may have more needs to have another child than she is admitting" and concluded that
"except for the above reservations, Ms. Whitehead is recommended as an appropriate candi-
date." See Brief for Appellant, at 9 n.14 in Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988)
(citing psychological evaluation).
12. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 424, 537 A.2d at 1241.
13. Id. at 436, 537 A.2d at 1247.
14. ICNY encouraged Mary Beth to refer to the baby as Mr. Stem's child. When queried
about her feelings during the pregnancy, she testified, "[i]t was just being the mother ... I
was trying not to think of those feelings, but it overpowered me." Record at 61-12 to 61-14.
Moreover, Mary Beth testified that going through delivery, seeing and holding the baby, and
knowing it was her child, convinced her she could not give up her baby. Record at 65-11 to
65-15.
15. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 414, 537 A.2d at 1236.
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crying hysterically and inconsolably over the loss of her baby. She
pleaded with the Sterns for one more week with her child at her
home. The Sterns reluctantly assented.'" On April 12, 1986, Mrs.
Whitehead informed the Sterns she could not part with her child.1
After consultation with Noel Keane, an attorney and founder of
the Infertility Center, the Sterns commenced legal proceedings to
regain possession of the baby and enforce the surrogacy contract.
The trial court, with the Honorable Harvey R. Sorkow presiding,
on Mr. Stern's ex parte application,18 signed an order on May 5,
1986, directing Mrs. Whitehead to deliver the child she was nurs-
ing to Mr. Stern. The police, the process server, and the Sterns
entered the Whiteheads' home to execute the order. The White-
heads fled with the child to Florida where Mrs. Whitehead's par-
ents lived, residing in numerous places to avoid apprehension. On
July 31, 1986 Florida law enforcement officials, pursuant to a court
order obtained under the Uniform Child Custody Act (premised on
the May 5, 1986 ex parte order), forcibly removed the baby from
the maternal grandparents' home and transferred custody to the
Sterns.' e
B. Trial Court's Opinion in Baby M
"The contract is not illusory" the judge said. "Mrs. Whitehead was
anxious to contract. This court finds that she had changed her mind,
reneged on her promise, and now seeks to avoid her obligations." A
visitor from Mars would be surprised to discover that Mary Beth
Whitehead was a mother and the article in dispute her child.
After the birth, she changed her mind. Sorkow was unmoved:
"The bargain is for totally personal service." Here is a judge who
would have used contract law to uphold Shylock's demand for a
pound of flesh.
Richard Cohen, Philadelphia Inquirer, April 2, 1987
16. Id. at 415, 537 A.2d at 1236-37.
17. In the mater of Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, -, 525 A.2d 1128, 1145 (Ch. Div. 1987)
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
18. Mr. Stern alleged, in support of the ex parte order, that Mrs. Whitehead had
breached the surrogacy contract and had threatened to flee from New Jersey to avoid his
obtaining custody of the child. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 415-16, 537 A.2d at 1237. Barbara Co-
hen, in Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It? 10 AM. J. L. & Mmn. 243, 260 (1984), observed
that commentators have indicated courts would not be likely to take a child from a natural
mother who breached a surrogacy contract. Yet in the Baby M case, the court ordered just
such an action before holding a hearing, conducting an investigation, or determining sub-
stantively that the child's health or welfare was threatened.
19. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 416, 537 A.2d at 1237.
[Vol. 25:53
SURROGATE MOTHER CONTRACT
In a fifty-eight page decision rendered on March 31, 1987,2" Su-
perior Court Judge Harvey R. Sorkow upheld for the first time the
validity of a surrogate mother contract. In so doing, Judge Sorkow
regarded adoption laws as inapplicable to surrogate contracts, find-
ing that when the adoption statutes were passed, surrogacy was
not a viable procreation alternative and was thus unknown.21 In a
few brief paragraphs, significant issues regarding the rights of the
child, the potential emotional and economic exploitation of the
surrogate mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, and the denigration of
human dignity were brushed aside. Judge Sorkow distinguished
surrogacy from adoption in that coercive, exploitative elements
were lacking where the surrogate makes her decision prior to her
pregnancy.22 His response to the assertion that money was being
paid for the surrender of a child was: "[the] biological father pays
the surrogate for her willingness to be impregnated and carry his
child to term. At birth, the father does not purchase the child. He
cannot purchase what is already his. ' 23 He dismissed summarily as
"insensitive and offensive to the intense drive to procreate" 24 the
argument that an elite economic group would utilize a lower eco-
nomic group of women as breeders.
The lower court then turned to New Jersey standard contract
law to determine that the surrogate contract was valid. Stressing
the anticipated "joy that only a newborn can bring," the court con-
cluded that specific performance was the appropriate equitable
remedy.25 In his decision, the judge found that the right to procre-
ate noncoitally is protected under the fourteenth amendment guar-
antees of privacy and equal protection, citing the legality of sperm
20. Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
21. Id. at -, 525 A.2d at 1157.
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Sorkow, citing with approval an article by Noel Keane,
Surrogate Motherhood, So. ILL. L.J. 147 (1980), observed that the adverse pressure and ex-
ploitation of the unplanned pregnancy is not present. Id.
24. Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at -, 525 A.2d at 1158.
25. The court indicated that a surrogate mother could renounce the contract until the
time of conception-until that point she would be subject only to monetary damages. After
conception, only specific performance could adequately redress the loss suffered by the
adoptive parents. Id. at -, 525 A.2d at 1159. The only exception to this new rule of law
was that the clause prohibiting abortion, except as determined by the male promisor, was
deemed violative of the guidelines set forth in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Id.
1990]
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donation as justification for the recognition of surrogacy.26 The
lower court, thus, equated the effort and experience inherent in
sperm donation with gestation in the womb. The court then de-
voted the remainder of its decision to assessing whether specific
enforcement of the contract comported with the "best interests" of
the child according to New Jersey custody law. The court con-
cluded by terminating Mary Beth Whitehead's parental rights,
awarding permanent custody to Stern and immediately conducting
the adoption proceeding at which Stern's wife adopted the child.
Judge Sorkow's opinion was notable not only for the immediacy
of his decision to terminate all maternal rights and allow adoption
of the child by Mrs. Stern, but also for the harsh and contemptu-
ous manner in which he treated Mrs. Whitehead. Many legal schol-
ars, including those who supported the conclusions, stated that the
judge was "unnecessarily brutal" in his criticism of Mrs. White-
head.17 He was scathing in his analysis of her character, terming
her "manipulative, impulsive, and exploitive. She is also for the
most part, untruthful, choosing only to remember what may en-
hance her position, or altering the facts about which she is testify-
ing."'28 He further found her "too enmeshed with this infant child
and unable to separate her own needs from those of the child."2
Somewhat inconsistently, while he deemed her a good mother for
her older children, he concluded she would not be a good custodian
for Baby M.30 Judge Sorkow also emphasized the disparate educa-
tional attainments of the Whiteheads (only Mr. Whitehead gradu-
26. Id. at -, 525 A.2d 1164-65.
27. Bird, Baby M Ruling's Boldness May Invite Appellate Attack, 119 N.J.L.J. 581 (Apr.
9, 1987).
28. Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at -, 525 A.2d at 1170. Judge Sorkow cited Mary Beth
Whitehead's impulsive behavior, her dropping out of high school and her flight to Florida in
violation of his ex parte court order to justify removing her newborn child from her home.
Id. at -, 525 A.2d at 1168, 1170.
29. Id. at -, 525 A.2d at 1170.
30. Id. The court consistently criticized Mrs. Whitehead for her conduct, yet did not criti-
cize the Sterns for the same conduct. The court criticized Mrs. Whitehead for continuing
"to reject any role Mr. Stern played in the conception. She chooses to forget that but for
him there would be no child." Id. at -, 525 A.2d at 1169. The court did not similarly
chastise Mr. Stern for minimizing Mrs. Whitehead's contributions in the surrogate arrange-
ment. Rather, the court and some proponents of surrogacy view the male's right to have a
child as paramount and the mother's interest in that child as clearly subordinate. As ob-
served by one commentator, the premise of surrogate motherhood is the traditional and
oppressive female role it reinforces. See Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, 16 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 27, 31 (1988). Further, the court denounced Mrs. Whitehead for her
"fawning use of the media to her own narcissistic ends" while failing to comment at all on
the interviews conducted by the Sterns. Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at -, 525 A.2d at 1168.
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ated high school) and the Sterns (both of whom have doctoral de-
grees in the sciences) and concluded that there was a reduced
emphasis on education in the Whitehead home.31 Judge Sorkow
concluded his opinion by vowing to use the court's total authority
to attain stability and peace in the child's life. Whitehead's lawyers
then sought to take the case directly to the New Jersey Supreme
Court. 2
C. New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion
There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot
buy .... There are, in short, values that society deems more impor-
tant than granting to wealth whatever it can buy, be it labor, love or
life.
We invalidate the surrogacy contract because it conflicts with the
law and public policy of this State. While we recognize the depth of
31. 217 N.J. Super at -, 525 A.2d at 1168. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in
New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 603, 512 A.2d 438, 444
(1986): "It is not a choice between a home with all the amenities and a simple apartment, or
an upbringing with the classics on the bookshelf as opposed to the mass media, or even
between parents providers of vastly unequal skills." The amici brief submitted by the
Women's Rights Litigation Clinic at Rutgers Law School, the New York State Coalition on
Women's Legislative Issues and the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee argued
that the lower court's decision was so infused with sex-based and class-based stereotypes
that it constituted a violation of Mary Beth Whitehead's rights to equal treatment and fun-
damental fairness. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M criticized the trial court's
emphasis on the Stems' interest in the child's education as compared to the Whiteheads',
stating:
That this is a legitimate factor to be considered we have no doubt. But it should not
be overlooked that a best interests test is designed to create not a new member of the
intelligentsia but rather a well integrated person who might reasonably be expected
to be happy with life.
Baby M, 109 N.J. at 406, 537 A.2d at 1260.
32. Pending the outcome of the appeal, the court granted continuation of limited visita-
tion to Mrs. Whitehead. On appeal, numerous amicus curiae briefs were filed which repre-
sented the views of the following organizations: American Adoption Congress, Catholic
League for Religious and Civil Rights, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
Concerned United Birthparents, Inc., Concerned Women for America, Eagle Forum, Na-
tional Legal Foundation, Family Research Council of America, United Families Foundation,
Judicial Reform Project, The Foundation on Economic Trends, Hudson County Legal Ser-
vices Corporation, and National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., Committee for
Mother and Child Rights, Inc., Origins, National Association of Surrogate Mothers, The
National Committee for Adoption, Inc., National Infertility Network Exchange, New Jersey
Catholic Conference, Odyssey Institute International, Inc., RESOLVE, Inc., Rutherford In-
stitute, Women's Rights Litigation Clinic at Rutgers Law School, The New York State Coa-
lition on Women's Legislative Issues, and the National Emergency Civil Liberties Commit-
tee. It should be noted that only two of these groups proffered support for the surrogate
mother contract.
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the yearning of infertile couples to have their own children, we find
the payment of money to a "surrogate" mother illegal, perhaps crim-
inal, and potentially degrading to women.
It seems to us that given her predicament, Mrs. Whitehead was
rather harshly judged-both by the trial court and some of the ex-
perts. She was guilty of a breach of contract, and indeed, she did
break a very important promise, but we think it is expecting some-
thing well beyond normal human capabilities to suggest that this
mother should have parted with her newly born infant without a
struggle. Other than survival, what stronger force is there?
New Jersey Supreme Court, In the Matter of Baby M, February 3,
1988
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written
by Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz, reversed virtually the entire
decision of the lower court and relentlessly attacked commercial
surrogate mother contracts.3 3 As observed by one commentator,
Whether it was the stinging condemnation of the practice under the
current statutory or regulatory frameworks, or whether it was the
equally scorching criticism of the trial court's handling of the case,
and of the parties for that matter, the court's holdings constitute the
strongest critiques to date that any body-legislative, judicial, or
other-has made of the practice.34
The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court is notable for both
the severity with which it regarded surrogacy contracts and the
compassion it afforded its participants, particularly the much
maligned Mary Beth Whitehead.
While the court recognized the intense longing of an infertile
couple to have children, it also recognized the compelling nature of
the relationship between a natural mother and her child. Declaring
that the natural mother was inappropriately called the surrogate
mother,3 5 the court invalidated the surrogacy contract as violative
33. Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
34. Dunne & Serio, Surrogate Parenting After Baby M: The Ball Moves to the Legisla-
ture's Court, 4 TouRo L. REv. 161, 163 (1988).
35. The term "surrogate mother" denies that the surrogate is the birth mother or mother.
It serves to diminish and demean the mother's contributions by according her the status of
a carrier of the father's child. The mother is dehumanized and perceived as the incidental
means to the father's achievement of paternity. Thus, Judge Sorkow viewed Whitehead as
an "alternative reproductive method." Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at -, 525 A.2d at 1164. Dr.
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of both New Jersey law and public policy. The court then voided
both the termination of the natural mother's rights and the adop-
tion of the child by the wife/stepparent. However, the court did
grant custody to the natural father, believing such custody to be in
the best interests of the infant. The court did not render voluntary
surrogacy without payment illegal, nor did it find a constitutional
prohibition against the practice, thereby affording the state legisla-
ture an opportunity to legalize it in the future.3 6
The court's review and analysis of the surrogacy contract ren-
dered the entire agreement invalid and unenforceable as violative
of New Jersey statutory provisions prohibiting the use of money in
connection with adoption,37 state laws mandating proof of parental
Lee Salk, witness for the Sterns, testified that Mrs. Whitehead was a "surrogate uterus."
Record at 14-14 to 14-18; see also Record at 11-13 to 11-24. The trial court's perspective is
reminiscent of the now discarded Aristotelian theory of human reproduction, wherein
women merely served as the passive incubator of the active male principle's seed. See G.
CoREA, Tan MoTHER MAcmNE 221 (1985); see also HUNTER COLLEGE WOMEN'S STUDmS COL-
LECTIVE, WOMEN'S REALrras, WOMEN'S CHOICES 63-64 (1983). The first surrogate mother in
this country, Elizabeth Kane, initially disclaimed any rights to, or attachmenlt for, the child
she was carrying, stating she was simply "growing" it for the father. She later repudiated
her role and urged that surrogate motherhood be banned by law because of the unexpected
damage it did to surrogate mothers, their children and their families. See E. KANE, BIrTH
MOTHER. THE STORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST LEGAL SURROGATE MOTHER (1988). Noel Keane, in
articulating his views or surrogacy, makes it clear that the surrogate mother has to realize
she is carrying the child of the natural father and his wife. Barron, Views on Surrogacy
Harden After Baby M. Ruling, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at Al, col. 3. One of the most
frequently quoted commentators on the surrogate contract, George J. Annas, observes that
the phrase "surrogate mother" originated in Harlow's monkey studies in which newborn
monkeys were separated from their natural mothers and placed with surrogate mothers,
inanimate cloth covered or wire monkeys, to test their responses. He adds that the surrogate
mother contract regards the natural mother as an inanimate object. See Annas, Fairy Tales
Surrogate Mothers Tell, 16 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 27-28 (1988).
36. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1235; see infra note 93 (The New Jersey
Bioethics Commission in May 1990 recommended to the New Jersey legislature that surro-
gate contracts be illegal and that penalties be applied to strongly discourage the practice.).
Gratuitous surrogate motherhood, as noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, is unlikely to
survive inasmuch as money is impliedly the primary motivation for the surrogacy. Baby M,
109 N.J. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248. In permitting gratuitous surrogacy, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court apparently felt the dangers indigenous to the commercial surrogate contract
would be obviated, including violation of baby selling laws, irrevocability of the mother's
consent to adoption and the economic exploitation of women. Gratuitous surrogacy, how-
ever, still encompasses serious risks of harm, such as the separation of the child and the
natural mother and the concomitant psychological consequences. See infra notes 126-50 and
accompanying text (discussion of the psychological problems severance of parental ties may
cause in natural mothers and their children); see also Comment, Where Do The Children
Go?--Surrogate Mother Contracts and the Best Interests of the Child, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1187, 1212 (1988); Wilson, Surrogate Motherhood-A Form of Maternal Prostitu-
tion-Merits Blanket Condemnation, N.Y. ST. B.J. 32 (Dec. 1988).
37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54(a) (West Supp. 1990).
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unfitness or abandonment as a requisite to the termination of pa-
rental rights or the granting of an adoption,8 and state laws mak-
ing surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in pri-
vate placement adoptions.3 9 The court forcefully refuted the
Sterns' contention that payment was solely for Whitehead's ser-
vices and not for the adoption by noting that "they would pay
nothing in the event that the child died before the fourth month of
pregnancy, and only $1,000 if the child were stillborn, even though
the 'services' had been fully rendered."'40 The court further ob-
served that "[i]t strains credulity to claim that these arrangements
touted by those in the surrogacy business as an attractive alterna-
tive to the usual route leading to an adoption, really amount to
something other than a private placement adoption for money.''41
In contrast to adoption which seeks to promote the best interests
of the child, the court stated that surrogacy places a child without
regard to the child's or the mother's interest. The suitability of the
adoptive parents is not a concern; rather, the highest bidder can
become the parents.42
The court noted that in Sees v. Baber," it had determined that
in an unregulated private placement, no termination of parental
rights would exist without proof that parental obligations had been
forsaken. Absent a strong showing of abandonment or neglect, pa-
rental rights will not be terminated. Thus, a contractual agreement
to abandon one's parental rights is regarded as unenforceable. Fi-
nally, with regard to statutory grounds, the court deemed the con-
tract clause encompassing the irrevocable consent by the mother to
surrender the child and terminate her parental rights in conflict
with those laws that provide irrevocable consent only with an ap-
proved agency; consent in a private placement adoption is "not
only revocable but, when revoked early enough, irrelevant."'44
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in this case further
served to strongly and forcefully affirm the significance of the
mother-child relationship in its enunciation of the public policies
violated by the surrogate contract. Those fundamental policies in-
38. Id. § 9:2-13(d); see also id. § 9:3-48(c)(1).
39. Id. §§ 9:2-14, 9:2-16.
40. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 424, 537 A.2d at 1241.
41. Id. at 425, 537 A.2d at 1241.
42. Id. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248.
43. 74 N.J. 201, 377 A.2d 628 (1977).
44. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
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cluded that the mother-child relationship be maintained and not
severed where possible, that determinations regarding custody and
adoption be conducted in accordance with the child's best interests
and not pursuant to contractual terms, that the rights of natural
parents be deemed equal concerning their child45 and that the sur-
45. The statutes governing rights of married parents to the custody of a child confirm
that such rights, in the absence of misconduct, shall be equal and that the father shall not
have preference over the mother as to the award of custody. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West
Repl. Vol. 1976). Moreover, New Jersey extends this statutory policy equally to every child
and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents by virtue of the Parent-
age Act. Id. § 9:17-40. In contrast, the New Jersey judiciary strictly enforced the general
common law principle that granted the father preference over the mother regarding custody
and control of his children upon separation or divorce. State v. Stigall, 22 N.J.L. 286 (1849).
As the sole parent with the paramount right to the children, the father, without the consent
of the mother, could apprentice the children but as laborers and appoint in his will a testa-
mentary guardian for the children other than his living wife. Stigall, 22 N.J.L. at 288.
The Act of March 20, 1860, ch. 167, N.J. Laws 437, materially altered the presumption
regarding paternal custody. This Act provided that children, under the age of seven years,
should be transferred to or remain in the custody of their mother unless she had a character
and habits rendering her an improper guardian for her children. It is significant to note that
the tender years doctrine set forth in this statute did not deny or erode the primary right of
the father to the ultimate custody of the child, nor was the law based on any recognition of
women's rights; rather, it was premised upon the cultural ideology about the nurturing ca-
pacities of the mother. Thus, in Bennett v. Bennett, 13 N.J. Eq. 114 (1860), the court felt
compelled to deliver custody of all the children under the age of seven to the mother until
they attained such age as to invoke the father's entitlement of custody.
A statute passed on February 21, 1871, endeavored to address the inequities of the com-
mon law rule and the 1860 statute by equalizing the rights of parents with respect to cus-
tody and making the father's right to appoint testamentary guardians and to apprentice
children contingent upon the mother's consent. Act approved Feb. 21, 1871, ch. 48, 1871
N.J. Laws 15. The enactment of the 1871 statute represented the first time New Jersey law
deemed men and women, in the absence of misconduct, as equals with respect to custody.
See LATOURET=E, Ann Hora Connelly 1824-1880 in PAST AND PROMISE: THE LIvES OF NEW
JERSEY WOMEN (1990) for a historical discussion of the development of the 1871 law. This
statute abolished the preference afforded the father and arguably also eliminated the prefer-
ence accorded mothers with respect to custody of children of tender years. In Baby M, 109
N.J. at 453 n.17, 537 A.2d at 1256, n.17, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that, under
the 1871 statute, both the father's superior right to the children and the mother's right to
custody of children of tender years were eliminated. But see Landis v. Landis, 39 N.J.L. 274
(1877) (the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 1871 statute did not expressly or im-
pliedly repeal the 1860 statute and its tender years doctrine and awarded custody of the
children under seven years of age to the mother pursuant to the authority of the Act of
1860).
Whether or not the 1871 statute is construed as eliminating the tender years doctrine, the
doctrine has persisted because of prevailing views regarding the necessity and benefits of a
mother's care for a young child. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 453 n.17, 537 A.2d at 1256 n.17; Espo-
sito v. Esposito, 41 N.J. 143, 145, 195 A.2d 295, 296 (1963); The New Jersey Supreme Court
indicated in Baby M that while it would be inappropriate to utilize a presumption in deter-
mining custody, "equality does not mean that all of the considerations underlying the
'tender years' doctrine have been abolished. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256 n.17.
Thus, in view of the "unquestionable bond" that exists between a mother and her baby, the
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render of a mother's right to her child be conducted under the
most careful of circumstances. In this regard, the court noted that
the psychological report which indicated Mary Beth Whitehead
might experience difficulty in relinquishing her child was not
shown to her. It was apparent to the court that the "profit motive
got the better of the Infertility Center. . . . To inquire further...
might have jeopardized [their] fee."4
Finally, the court concluded that while differences between
adoption and surrogacy exist,47 the evil indigenous to both is that a
woman's circumstances (an unwanted pregnancy or the need for
money) may render her susceptible to exploitation and the taking
away of her child.48 The court bluntly concluded that in surrogacy,
"[w]hatever idealism may have motivated any of the participants,
the profit motive predominates, permeates and ultimately governs
the transaction."4 In response to the often proffered point that
court suggested that a mother who has custody of her child for several months will have a
particularly strong claim for custody. Id. The bond between mother and child to which the
New Jersey Supreme Court referred has been the subject of scientific research which has
examined the nature of the attachment and the consequences of a severance of the bond.
See J. BOWLBY, ATrACHMENT AND Loss: VOLUME III, (1980) and M. KLAUS and J. KENNELL,
PARENT-INFANT BONDING (1982). But see Younger, What the Baby M Case Is Really All
About, 6 LAW & INEQUALITY 75, 81 (1988) (disputing the existence of a bond between a
biological mother and her young and asserting that the court's acceptance of this bond
bodes ill for women, as it appears to portray them as "slaves to their biological destinies").
It is significant to note that under the 1871 statute, which afforded men and women equal
rights to the custody of their children, the "happiness and welfare of the children" was
enunciated as the standard for determining custody, a rule which remains to this day. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West Repl. Vol. 1976). According to one commentator, this section of the
1871 statute justifies continued application of the tender years doctrine to custody deci-
sions. The equality of parental rights assumes a secondary importance with the primary
focus on the right of the child to a parent's custodial care. In this view, courts have contin-
ued to apply the tender years doctrine by deeming it a factor relevant to the happiness and
welfare of the child. See Note, Tender Years Doctrine: In the Matter of Baby M, 40
RUTGERS L. REv. 1345, 1348 (1988).
It should also be noted that the court implicitly rebuked Judge Sorkow for his issuance of
the ex parte order forcibly removing the infant from Mary Beth Whitehead, stating that
only the most extreme cases would justify removing a child from its mother pendente lite,
in light of the child's and mother's need to strengthen their bond. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 462,
537 A.2d at 1261. One commentator and one amicus brief suggest that the cultural notions
inherent in the tender years doctrine have been validated by modern child development
theory and modern biological science. See Grosman, Recent Developments in Custody Law,
127 NEW JERSEY LAW. 27 (1989); Brief of Gruter Institute Amicus Curiae; see also Note,
Tender Years Doctrine: In the Matter of Baby M, 40 RUTGERs L. REv. 1345 (1988).
46. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1247-48.
47. Id. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248.
48. Id. at 439, 537 A.2d at 1249.
49. Id. One commentator, Richard H. Nakamura, Jr., provides insight into the manner in
which surrogate businesses are conducted. Many proponents of surrogacy adopted a morally
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Mrs. Whitehead knowingly agreed to the surrogacy arrangement,
the court dismissed her consent as irrelevant. It reflected its under-
standing of a "process that engages the most profound and subtle
of human feelings," 0 stating "[t]here are, in a civilized society,
some things that money cannot buy. . . . There are . . . . values
that society deems more important than granting to wealth
whatever it can buy, be it labor, love, or life."'
The court concluded its analysis with a discussion of the relative
parenting rights of the parties. In the absence of any finding by the
trial court that Mary Beth Whitehead abandoned or substantially
neglected her parental duties or was deemed unfit, the court con-
cluded she was entitled to retain her rights as a mother.5 2 More-
over, the retention of her constitutional right to the companionship
of her child did not serve to deprive Mr. Stern of his right to pro-
create, which is simply the right to have natural children, whether
through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination.5 3 Further, the
court disagreed with Stern's contention that he was denied equal
protection of the laws because the state statutorily54 grants full pa-
rental rights to a husband whose wife, with his consent, has borne
beneficient posture, assuring proper screening, counseling, and careful selection for the ben-
efit of the infertile couple. The facts in the Baby M case, however, reflect a less ideal situa-
tion. Some lawyer surrogate brokers such as Katie Brophy of Louisville, Kentucky, view
advertising as unprofessional. Others, do in fact advertise. One such broker, William Handel
of Los Angeles, stated at a 1984 health law symposium, that he prefers advertising in the
L.A. Times, but has utilized TV Guide, a radio station and several magazines. Some surro-
gate brokers, including Handel, exercise caution and restraint in selecting adoptive couples,
excluding those who simply do not want to be concerned with a pregnancy; others do not.
Noel Keane has stated that his initial interview with a couple takes a substantial amount of
time. However, Rochelle Sharpe, a reporter for Gannett News Service, indicated in one arti-
cle that Keane signed up clients after only a twenty minute interview. Moreover, she as-
serted that he waived a couple's psychiatric exam by stating he knew by talking to them
they were not "loony tunes." Sharpe, Surrogate Mother Program Under Attack, Detroit
News, Nov. 2, 1986, at 4B, col. 3. Another writer, Anne Taylor Fleming, reported that Keane
pairs surrogates with adoptive couples in Saturday morning matchups, where potential sur-
rogates parade through rooms occupied by the couples, in order to facilitate a match. Ac-
cording to Fleming, Keane subtly pressured couples not to pass up promising candidates.
Fleming, Our Fascination with Baby M, N.Y. Times Magazine, Mar. 29, 1987, at 33, 35. For
a full discussion of'these issues, see Nakamura, Jr., Behind the 'Baby M' Decision: Surro-
gacy Lawyering Reviewed, 13 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 3019 (June 2, 1987).
50. Kempton, Baby M's Mother Made Her Point, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 6, 1988, at
A7.
51. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 440-41, 537 A.2d at 1249.
52. Id. at 447, 537 A.2d at 1253.
53. Id. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253.
54. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1990).
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a child resulting from a sperm donation. 5 As the court observed,
the claim of an equal protection violation in this instance is one to
be raised by Mrs. Stern, in that she is in the same position as the
infertile husband in the statute.5 6 Moreover, the court concluded
that no parallelism existed between a sperm donation and a nine
month pregnancy.
5 7
In its discussion of custody, the court endeavored to cast a
sharply different perspective on the conduct and character of Mary
Beth Whitehead. The court extended a generous measure of com-
passion to her, in striking contrast to that proffered by the trial
court, the experts or the guardian ad litem appointed by Judge
Sorkow.55 The court observed that while she did break a very im-
portant promise,
. . . [W]e think that it is expecting something well beyond normal
human capabilities to suggest that this mother should have parted
with her newly born infant without a struggle. Other than survival,
what stronger force is there? We do not know of, and cannot con-
55. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 449-50, 537 A.2d at 1254.
56. Id. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1254.
57. Id. The court reasoned that a sperm donor can be readily distinguished from a surro-
gate mother, "even if the only difference is between the time it takes to provide sperm for
artificial insemination and the time invested in a nine-month pregnancy-so as to justify
automatically divesting the sperm donor of his parental rights without automatically divest-
ing a surrogate mother." Id. The New Jersey artificial insemination statute, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-44, upon which Mr. Stern premised his equal protection argument, treats the con-
senting infertile husband of an artificially inseminated wife as if he were the natural father
of the child conceived. The statute is patterned after the MODEL UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §
5, M.U.P.A. 287, 301-02 (1987) which has been adopted by several other states, including
Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
vada, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. See Comment, Surro-
gate Mother Contracts: Analysis of a Remedial Quagmire, 37 EMORY L.J. 721, 735, n.76
(1988); Bartlett, Surrogate Parenthood: Finding a North Carolina Solution, 18 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 1, 10 (1988); and Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: Should the Adoption Model Apply?
7 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 13, 14 (1986). The constitutionality of the automatic divestiture
of a sperm donor's parental rights pursuant to a state artificial insemination statute is pres-
ently being challenged in Crouch v. McIntyre, 98 Or. App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1924 (1990). In this case, the United States Supreme Court let stand an
Oregon Court of Appeals decision permitting an unmarried sperm donor the opportunity to
prove his sperm was given to an unmarried female friend conditioned on their agreement
that he assume a parental role. The woman denied such an agreement was made. The Ore-
gon artificial insemination statute provides that a donor of semen has no legal right to act as
a parent unless he is the mother's husband. OR. RFv. STAT. § 109.239 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
58. The guardian ad litem for Baby M, attorney Lorraine Abraham, initially recom-
mended against termination of Whitehead's parental rights, but suggested a five year sus-
pension of visitation. She later amended that recommendation to suggest no visitation until
the child attained maturity. The court found her initial recommendation unusual, nearly
bordering on termination. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 465-66, 537 A.2d at 1262-63.
SURROGATE MOTHER CONTRACT
ceive of, any other case where a perfectly fit mother was expected to
surrender her newly born infant, perhaps forever, and was then told
she was a bad mother because she did not."
Moreover, although the court disapproved of her conduct violating
a court order, it recognized that her action merited a measure of
understanding.
We do not find it so clear that her efforts to keep her infant, when
measured against the Sterns' efforts to take her away, make one,
rather than the other, the wrongdoer. The Sterns suffered but so did
she. And if we go beyond suffering to an evaluation of the human
stakes involved in the struggle, how much weight should be given to
her nine months of pregnancy, the labor of childbirth, and the risk
to her life, compared to the payment of money, the anticipation of a
child, and the donation of sperm."0
The court disputed the portrait of Mary Beth Whitehead as a
selfish, grasping individual indifferent to the needs of Baby M and
her other children. There is "not one word in the record [to] sug-
59. Id. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259. It is interesting to note that one of the leading propo-
nents of surrogate contracts, California attorney William W. Handel, would make precisely
that "inconceivable" argument. Mr. Handel, in a question and answer session that was part
of a presentation at the Third Annual Whittier Health Law Symposium on March 24, 1984
responded to the queries: 1) what happens if a surrogate changes her mind; and 2) is the
surrogate agreement an enforceable contract:
MR. HANDEL: Well, as a practical matter, we probably would not sue on the con-
tract because the contract would probably be tossed out in the first 30 seconds. There
would probably be a summary judgment, so what we would do is we would use a
noncontract basis cause of action, and that is intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. That is what we feel is the strongest protection that the couple has, and it
allows us, in California particularly, to utilize that in our program.
Now, needless to say, we have never had that problem. In meeting Dawn and meet-
ing other surrogates, that is the risk that we feel less afraid of than almost anything
else. Not only are these women very strong, independent women who know exactly
what they are doing, it takes someone with, in our opinion, very dubious moral values
who can get pregnant, who has already gotten pregnant and has children of their own
and have met a couple, to look at them and say, "I'm going to keep your baby,"
particularly when it is the husband's sperm and the intent of this whole process
would take the baby back into their arms.
The few times surrogates have changed their minds in other programs throughout
the country, there has been no screening or the surrogates have been verifiable crazy
and they did not meet the couple, and it is more nebulous. They are not disap-
pointing that particular couple.
See Sherwyn, Attorney Duties in the Area of New Reproductive Technologies, 6 WHrTTIER
L. REv. 799, 809 (1984).
60. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 459-60, 537 A.2d at 1259.
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gest that her change of mind and her subsequent fight for her child
was motivated by anything other than love. '6' Finally, the court
mandated that upon remand to a trial court 2 for purposes of de-
ciding visitation, Mary Beth be regarded as the natural and legal
mother, that she not be penalized due to the surrogacy contract,
and that her own interest in visitation as well as the child's be
considered. 3
D. Impact of the Baby M Decision
This court is unable to concur in the determination ... that pay-
ments pursuant to a surrogacy contract do not violate the law of this
State. My analysis [of statutes and policy of this State] leads me to
the conclusion, as stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby
M, that the contract at Bar provides for "the sale of a child, or, at
the very least, the sale of a mother's right to her child." . . . Such
contracts are, therefore, void under the law of the State of New
York as it exists at present.
The Honorable Carolyn E. Demarest, Family Court Judge, New
York, In the Matter of the Adoption of Paul, January 22, 1990
Maybe this whole garbage that you shouldn't be able to buy babies
should be looked at-hard-by the ABA.
Donald Reisig, Michigan attorney and advocate for surrogate moth-
erhood at the ABA National Conference on Birth, Death and Law,
quoted by Craig R. McCoy, Despite the Latest Ruling, the Legal
Debate Rages On, Philadelphia Inquirer, February 5, 1988.
61. Id. at 460, 537 A.2d at 1260.
62. The court remanded the matter to a different trial judge, citing the original trial
judge's potential "commitment to [his] findings" and the fact that the original trial judge
"has already engaged in weighing the evidence." Id. at 463, 537 A.2d at 1261 n.19.
63. The visitation order entered by Superior Court Judge Birger M. Sween on April 6,
1988, provided that immediate, unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation with her bio-
logical mother would be in the best interests of Melissa Stern (Baby M). Baby M, 225 N.J.
Super. 267, 542 A.2d 52 (1988). The court noted that the Sterns' testimony offered no evi-
dence supporting their fears that Melissa's relationship with her mother would adversely
affect her or their parent-child relationship. Interestingly, the court observed that "[n]either
the Sterns nor their expert seemed able to comprehend this is no longer a termination of
parental rights or adoption case and it no longer matters how Melissa was legally conceived.
She and her mother have the right to develop their own special relationship." Id. at _, 542
A.2d at 53.
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One day subsequent to the issuance of the New Jersey Supreme
Court opinion in Baby M, its chief protagonists, Gary N. Skoloff,
attorney for the Sterns, and Harold J. Cassidy, attorney for the
Whiteheads, continued to vociferously debate the merits, or lack
thereof, of the surrogate contract at an American Bar Association
Conference on Birth, Death, and Law in Philadelphia.6 4 Many legal
experts concurred with Cassidy who termed the decision the
"death knell" for commercial surrogacy e5 Arguments advanced for
the precedent setting value of the decision included that the opin-
ion presented a thorough and complete analysis of the issues, and
the New Jersey Supreme Court was nationally recognized as a
leader with regard to medical ethical issues .6s Brokers in the surro-
gate business countered that the decision would be construed nar-
rowly and have no substantial influence beyond its jurisdiction and
would potentially increase their business.6
It is significant to note that New Jersey's most vocal advocate
for surrogacy, Skoloff, concurred with his adversary to the extent
that he was pessimistic regarding the future of surrogate agree-
ments.6 " Two years after the New Jersey Supreme Court decision it
is apparent that such pessimism was well founded. The impact of
the Baby M decision can be discerned in actions taken by legal
64. McCoy, Despite Latest Baby M Ruling, Legal Debate Rages On, Philadelphia In-
quirer, Feb. 5, 1988, at B1.
65. Bird, Baby M Decision Leaves Surrogacy's Future in Doubt, 121 N.J.L.J. 233, 260
(Feb. 11, 1988).
66. Id. But see Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood, 5 J. OF CoNTErip. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21, 29 (1989) (the author terms the Baby
M opinion "nothing short of an intellectual disaster." Judge Posner in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, derided the Baby M court's rationale as represen-
tative of a hostility to the marketplace and a fear of novelty. Id. at 31. Contending that he
had been falsely charged as an advocate of "baby selling," the judge justified the surrogate
arrangements because of the demands of the marketplace. This economic commodities-ori-
ented analysis appears to minimize sensitivity to issues such as ethics and the humanity of
those involved. Judge Posner states, for example, that a child born of a surrogate contract is
"much like that of a baby whose mother dies during the baby's infancy and whose father
then remarries." Id. at 23. Further, Judge Posner apparently perceives no distinction be-
tween a sperm donation and a surrogate pregnancy and disputes the notion that surrogate
motherhood is another form of baby selling:
What she sells is not the baby but her parental rights, and in this respect she is no
different from a woman who agrees in a divorce proceeding to surrender her claim to
custody of the children of the marriage in exchange for some other concession from
her husband-or from a sperm donor who receives cash, but no parental rights, in
exchange for his donation.
Id. at 28.
67. Bird, supra note 65, at 260.
68. Id.
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professional associations and advisory groups, state legislatures
and judiciary, and international bodies and courts of law.
1. Legal Professional Associations and Advisory Groups
The decision had an immediate impact upon the deliberations of
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Family Law Sec-
tion of the ABA, of which Gary N. Skoloff served as an officer, in
the summer of 1987, had endorsed a model surrogacy act that
would treat surrogate mother contracts as enforceable and would
strengthen the legal position of the father. The ABA House of Del-
egates at its February 1989 mid-year meeting, however, defeated
the model act in favor of a uniform act approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on August 4,
1988, which provided two options for lawmakers: 9 the first option
declared surrogacy contracts void as violative of public policy; the
second option upheld and provided guidelines for the contracts, fo-
cusing upon, and delineating the rights of, children born pursuant
to these arrangements. ° The act, entitled Uniform Status of Chil-
dren of Assisted Conception Act, was originally drafted subsequent
to Superior Court Judge Harvey Sorkow's decision to uphold the
surrogate contract, and it had solely provided for strict regulation
of the surrogacy arrangement. After the New Jersey Supreme
Court decision, however, the model legislation was amended to also
give states the option to make surrogate contracts invalid.71
2. State Legislatures and Judiciary
With respect to state judicial and legislative actions, the Baby M
decision has had a compelling effect. Several of the early decisions
relating to surrogate parenting did not directly address the validity
69. Surrogacy Act Passed, 75 A.B.A.J. 128 (1989).
70. The text of the act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws entitled "Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act" is set
forth in 15 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2009 (Feb. 21, 1989).
71. Bird, Uniform Law Commission Splits, 122 N.J.L.J. 605 (Sept. 8, 1988). For discus-
sions of other proposals for regulating surrogacy arrangements, see Greco, Parental Guid-
ance Suggested: A Proposal for Regulating Surrogate Parenthood, 22 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 115 (1989); Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern 'Family': A Proposed Uni-
form Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283 (1985); and Bezanson, Kurtz &
Hovenkamp, Model Human Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy Act, 72 IOWA L. REV.
943 (1987).
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of the surrogate mother contract.7 12 In cases in which the courts did
address the merits of the surrogacy issue, the analyses focused
upon the pertinent adoption and baby selling statutes, and the re-
sults were not consistent. In Doe v. Kelly,"3 for example, the Mich-
igan Court of Appeals broadly interpreted the state's baby selling
statutes to prohibit the payment of consideration to surrogate
mothers. 4 In this case, a married couple and the surrogate mother
challenged the constitutionality of such statutes as being violative
of their right to privacy.75 While concurring that the right to bear
and beget a child represents a fundamental right of the parties, the
court held that application of the statutes did not deprive them of
that right.76  The couple was permitted to have the child as
planned, but they were prohibited from making payment for the
child to the biological mother.7
The public policy aspect of surrogate parenting was addressed in
an adoption case, Miroff v. Surrogate Mother,78 decided by an In-
72. In Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983), reu'd, 420
Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985), the Michigan Attorney General sought to prevent the
biological father of a child born pursuant to a surrogate arrangement from establishing his
paternity under the Paternity Act. The Attorney General argued that the Act did not en-
compass surrogate arrangements. The trial court refused to issue an order recognizing his
paternity, deeming surrogate contracts violative of public policy. The Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Paternity Act sought to provide support for ilegiti-
mate children and should not be employed to effectuate a surrogate contract. The Michigan
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, finding that the father's petition was within the
subject matter jurisdiction conferred by the statute and that he could establish his paternity
regardless of the surrogate context in which his paternity arose. Syrkowski, 420 Mich. at -,
362 N.W.2d at 214. Similarly, in Sherwyn v. California State Dep't of Social Servs., 173 Cal.
App. 3d 55, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1985), the court did not deem it necessary to address the
merits of the surrogate contract, as the case did not present a justiciable controversy. The
court regarded the plaintiffs (two attorneys who represented parties in surrogate contracts
and who challenged the constitutional validity of the application of paternity and adoption
legislation as applied to surrogacy) as lacking standing. Id. at -, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
73. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
74. Id. at --. , 307 N.W.2d at 441.
75. The facts of this case indicated that the wife of the biological father was infertile due
to a tubal ligation and that the biological mother was employed as the father's secretary. Id.
at -, 307 N.W.2d at 440. Differences in the economic status of the parties prompt some
critics of commercial surrogacy to assert that surrogacy will be used as a vehicle for eco-
nomic exploitation of the poor by the rich. See Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARv. L.
REv. 1849, 1930 (1987). The New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M noted that while the
Sterns were not rich, nor the Whiteheads poor, their disparate wealth played a part in the
surrogate arrangement. The court regarded it as unlikely that upper income women would
serve as surrogates for low income infertile couples. In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396,
339-40, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988).
76. Doe, 106 Mich. App. at _, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
77. Id.
78. 13 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (Oct. 2, 1986).
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diana superior court in 1986. In this case, a guardian ad litem chal-
lenged the validity of the surrogate contract, which was not in dis-
pute by any of the parties to the agreement. The court's
condemnation of the contract as a violation of public policy was
premised on its conflict with the prohibitions against baby selling
and with adoption statutes which limit the expenses for which a
mother can be reimbursed. 9 Moreover, the court held the surro-
gate's agreement to indemnify the father for any child support he
might be ordered to pay was a "blatant attempt to void the court's
authority to enter a support order should custody be awarded to
the biological mother."80 While declaring the prenatal contractual
consent to adoption void, the court did approve the adoption in
view of the surrogate mother's reaffirmation of her consent. As in
79. Id.
80. Id. A few states have addressed the issue of a biological father's responsibility to a
child produced under a surrogate mother contract, where the natural mother obtains cus-
tody. The Indiana court in Miroff clearly indicated that it was empowered to enter a sup-
port order against the biological father in such a case. The Nebraska statute which declares
surrogate parenthood agreements void and unenforceable, sets forth the responsibilities of
the biological father to a child born of such an arrangement to include all rights and obliga-
tions imposed by law with regard to the child. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1988). See infra
note 93 for further discussion of the Nebraska statute. In Great Britain, a surrogate mother
was permitted to retain custody of the twins she bore pursuant to a privately negotiated
surrogacy arrangement which included payment. The mother's effort to have the court com-
pel the biological father to pay maintenance was deemed historic. However, she withdrew
her claim one year after filing. See Surrogate Mother Drops Claim, Press Ass'n Ltd., Oct.
26, 1989 (NEXIS, PANEWS file); see also infra note 110 (discussion of the British case).
The artificial insemination statutes (see supra note 57) which automatically divest the
sperm donor of parental rights and responsibilities, should provide no immunity from pa-
rental obligations for the biological father in a situation where a surrogacy contract has been
declared void and the surrogate mother obtains custody. Crouch v. McIntyre, 98 Or. App.
462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (discussed supra note 57), challenges the automatic divestiture of a
sperm donor's rights pursuant to a state artificial insemination statute. The United States
Supreme Court in Crouch upheld an Oregon appellate court decision allowing an unmarried
sperm donor the opportunity to prove his sperm was given to an unmarried female friend in
exchange for parental rights to the resulting child. The Crouch decision and logic would
suggest that where a surrogate mother contract is rendered void and the surrogate mother is
awarded custody, the biological father could be ordered to pay child support, irrespective of
both the marital status of the surrogate mother and the existence of a statute governing
artificial insemination. The artificial insemination statutes appear to contemplate the situa-
tion wherein an anonymous sperm donor is divested of all rights and protected from all
obligations with regard to the child produced. They would further appear to protect the
natural mother and her spouse, if any, from unwanted intrusion by the anonymous donor.
Clearly, in Crouch and in surrogate mother contract arrangements, the sperm donor is
known, intends to serve in a parental role and has agreed to do so, and provides sperm
premised on those intentions. Such an identifiable donor has a right to enjoy parental privi-
leges and a concomitant and equal duty to fulfill parental responsibility. A known donor is
distinguishable from the anonymous donor who donates sperm with the understanding that
absolutely no rights or responsibilities will be visited upon him.
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Doe v. Kelley,"1 the court ordered that the surrogate mother could
not be paid any sums in connection with the adoption . 2
In contrast, two cases decided in Kentucky and New York, upon
which surrogate advocates have relied, narrowly construed baby
selling and adoption laws as inapplicable to the surrogate mother
contract. Particularly noteworthy is the effect the Baby M decision
has had in these two states. In Surrogate Parenting Association v.
Armstrong,sa the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the surrogate
contract and its concomitant payment of consideration clause did
not violate baby selling laws because the surrogate contract was
not contemplated by the legislature when it drafted these statutes.
The court rather tenuously distinguished baby selling from com-
mercial surrogacy, focusing on "fundamental differences" regard-
ing the timing of the events. The court stated that baby selling
statutes are intended to prevent baby brokers "from overwhelming
an expectant mother or the parents of a child with financial in-
ducements to part with the child."84 Inasmuch as surrogate parent-
ing involves an agreement prior to conception, the court appar-
ently felt the financial pressures attendant to baby selling were
irrelevant. s5 The court did find the agreement voidable under the
state's adoption consent statutes which prohibit termination of pa-
rental rights prior to birth, but did not find the surrogacy contract
illegal per se.8 6
Similarly, the New York Surrogate's Court in In re Adoption of
Baby Girl L.J.8 7 decided that baby selling laws did not prohibit
payments to a surrogate mother pursuant to the contract terms.8 8
81. 106 Mich. App. at - 307 N.W.2d at 441.
82. 13 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (Oct. 2, 1986).
83. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
84. Id. at 211.
85. It could be argued that the "offensive financial pressure of baby selling is even more
pronounced with commercial surrogacy" inasmuch as the surrogate mother's sole motive is
the financial gain. See Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and
the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1171, 1202 (1988). Moreover, the New
Jersey Supreme Court was clearly not indifferent to the argument that finances will influ-
ence the course of surrogacy arrangements. "This is the sale of a child, or at the very least,
the sale of a mother's right to her child ... Almost every evil that prompted the prohibi-
tion of the payment of money in connection with adoption exists here." The court further
observed, "it appears that the essential evil is the same, taking advantage of a woman's
circumstances (the unwanted pregnancy or the need for money) in order to take away her
child, the difference being one of degree." Baby M, 109 N.J. at 437-39, 537 A.2d at 1248-49.
86. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 213.
87. 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1986).
88. This contract involved a private placement adoption wherein the biological father and
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Consistent with the Kentucky court, the New York court deemed
the timing of the preconception contract crucial in distinguishing
the transaction from baby selling.89 Further, the court stated that
existing statutes did not address the legality of commercial surro-
gate arrangements and that it was the legislature's role to discour-
age or encourage such practices.90 The court did, however, express
"strong reservations about these arrangements both on moral and
ethical grounds." 9' 1
The impact of the Baby M decision can be assessed in terms of
the different steps taken in Kentucky and New York subsequent to
the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling. Kentucky is one of several
states which has enacted anti-surrogacy laws since the New Jersey
decision.2 Kentucky's statute prohibits any person from making or
his wife contracted to pay the artificially inseminated surrogate mother $10,000 for the
child. The natural mother did not contest the adoption. Id. at 814. But see Yates v. Keane,
No. 887-9758-NC, (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 21, 1988). In Yates, Judge Timothy Green voided a
surrogate contract, stating such agreements are contrary to public policy. Further, Judge
Green expressed concern for the potential exploitation of children resulting from the pay-
ment of money to surrogate mothers. In this case, the surrogate mother, Laurie Yates of
Michigan, sued for custody of the twins she bore pursuant to a surrogate contract arranged
by lawyer Noel Keane. Initially, the court allowed the twins to live with Yates and her
husband. Custody was later amended to give the children to the biological father (Huber)
and his wife two weeks of every month. One week prior to the custody trial, Yates settled
the case, surrendered custody of the twins to the Hubers, waived any claim to the original
$10,000 Payment and was permitted six supervised visits per year with the twins. Her attor-
ney claimed Yates settled because she realized that she and her husband would be unable to
provide financially for the children in the manner the Hubers could. See Moss, Michigan
Surrogacy Fight Ends, A.B.A.J., July 1, 1988 at 30.
Yates and her husband are, however, still maintaining a lawsuit against Noel Keane, with
regard to alleged fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation in connection with the surrogate
contract. Their request for a list of all Keane's clients who had entered into surrogacy agree-
ments and a list of all surrogates who had served as such was upheld by the Court of Ap-
peals of Michigan, which reversed a lower court's holding. Yates v. Keane, 184 Mich., App.
80, 457 N.W.2d 693 (1990). An unpublished ruling issued by Superior Court Judge Victor
Pfau, Marion County, Indiana on October 2, 1986, declared that in an adoption proceeding,
a surrogate mother should not accept money since she would be guilty of baby selling. The
court also stated that a surrogacy contract is void inasmuch as a woman cannot consent pre-
birth to adoption. In this case, the woman did not object to the father taking custody. See
Bird, supra note 65, at 259.
89. Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
90. Id. at 818.
91. Id. at 817.
92. Prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Baby M, three states had legisla-
tion which addressed the issue of surrogacy. Nevada and Arkansas have statutes authorizing
surrogate parenting, but without specific enabling legislation. Nevada's statute, for example,
prohibits the payment of money or the offer of anything of value to the natural parent in
return for consent to, or cooperation with, adoption. NEv. REv. STAT. § 127.287(I) (Cum.
Supp. 1989). This provision does not apply "if a woman enters into a lawful contract to act
as a surrogate, be inseminated and give birth to the child of a man who is not her husband."
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assisting in making a surrogate agreement. The law voids any con-
tract entered into that contravenes this provision. Any contract
that would compensate a woman for being artificially inseminated
and would terminate her parental rights to a child born in accor-
dance with the arrangement is clearly prohibited.93
Id. § 127.287(5). Nevada statutes also state that pre-birth consents to adoption, and those
within seventy-two hours after birth are invalid. Id. § 127.070.
The Arkansas artificial insemination statute originally denoted that a child born by means
of artificial insemination to an unmarried woman shall be the child of the woman giving
birth except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which case the child shall be that of the
intended mother. Ai REv. STAT. § 9-10-201 (1987). The statute was amended in 1989 to
enlarge the definition of a surrogate mother to include both married and unmarried women.
It also expanded the class of legally recognized parents of a child born to a surrogate mother
to include biological father and his wife, the biological father alone if he is unmarried, and
the woman intended to be the mother where the surrogate mother was artificially insemi-
nated with an anonymous donor's sperm. Id. § 9-10-201. Louisiana passed the first legisla-
tion on surrogacy. It provides that such agreements are null and void and unenforceable as
contrary to public policy. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
93. Ky. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1990)' This stat-
ute was passed after Surrogate Parenting Ass'n, Inc. v. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (1986),
was decided. In Armstrong, the Kentucky Supreme Court narrowly interpreted baby selling
statutes to exclude surrogacy contracts from their prohibitions. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 83-86.
It should be noted that subsequent to the Baby M decision, five other states have passed
legislation which, in varying degrees, expresses opposition to the surrogate mother contract.
Michigan enacted a law in 1988 making surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable and
barring payment to the natural mother beyond medical costs incurred. MIcH. CoMP. LAws
ANN. § 722.851-.863 (West Cum. Supp. 1990). Further, the Michigan statute declared that
violation of the statute would be a felony, punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 for the
parties to the contract, and up to $50,000 or imprisonment for the broker in the arrange-
ment. The criminal penalties were challenged as violative of the rights to privacy and
parenthood by the American Civil Liberties Union, representing three couples who wished
to use a surrogate due to the wife's infertility and by two women who wished to bear chil-
dren for a fee. The Michigan Attorney General has since retreated from his position of
bringing criminal prosecutions. See 123 N.J.L.J. 436, (Feb. 23, 1989). In addition to its ag-
gressive posture with regard to rendering surrogate contracts void, the Michigan law is nota-
ble in that it invalidates several forms of surrogacy, including cases where the surrogate
mother is naturally or artificially inseminated and where an implantation of an embryo not
genetically related to the surrogate mother occurs. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.853 (West
Cum. Supp. 1990). Nebraska passed a law declaring surrogate parenting agreements void
and unenforceable. The Nebraska statute is distinctive in that it specifically sets forth the
responsibilities of the biological father to a child born pursuant to a void surrogate contract.
These include "all the rights and obligations imposed by law with respect to such child."
NED. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (Cum. Supp. 1988). Indiana has passed legislation declaring
surrogacy agreements void. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 and -2 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1990).
Moreover, the law provides that the agreement shall not serve as evidence in any court
determinations involving custody, visitation, child support, or related issues. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-8-2-3 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1990). Florida enacted a statute outlawing commercial surro-
gacy and permitting only gratuitous surrogate arrangements, although allowing payments
for all reasonable expenses of the surrogate mother. FL. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(i) (West
Cu. Supp. 1990).
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In New York, the Baby M decision had a different legislative
The most recently enacted statute prohibiting surrogate arrangements and one of the
most far reaching is that of Arizona. That law prohibits any person from entering into,
inducing, arranging, procuring, or otherwise assisting in the formation of a surrogate parent-
age contract. Further, the statute succinctly sets forth the parentage of the child, stating
that the surrogate mother is the legal mother and is entitled to custody of the child, irre-
spective of whether the surrogate agrees to the implantation of an embryo not related to
that woman or agrees to conceive a child through natural or artificial insemination. ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West Cum. Supp. 1989). Thus, pursuant to Arizona law, the ges-
tational surrogate who is not biologically related to the child to whom she gives birth would
be accorded the same legal status and rights as the traditional surrogate in a "Whitehead-
Stern" arrangement.
In marked contrast to the enactment of the Arizona legislature regarding a gestational
surrogate's status as the mother, is the recent California decision of Johnson v. Calvert,
where California Orange County Superior Court Judge Richard N. Parslow, Jr. ruled that
the gestational mother had no rights with regard to the baby she bore for an infertile couple.
See Gewertz, Infant's Genetic Parents Win Rights over Surrogate Mother, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Oct. 23, 1990 at 1-A, col. 1. The surrogate mother who had agreed to bear the
genetically unrelated baby for a fee of $10,000, had sought custody of the child and sought
to be deemed the boy's legal mother. Johnson asserted that she and the baby had developed
an unexpected, deep emotional attachment during the pregnancy. In upholding the surro-
gate contract in which she had agreed to carry an embryo conceived through in-vitro fertili-
zation utilizing the Calverts' sperm and egg, the court held that a gestational surrogate ac-
quires no parental rights to the child she carries. Moreover the judge opined that there was
"nothing wrong with getting paid for nine months of what I understand to be a lot misery."
Id. at 8-A.
The Johnson decision represents the first time a court has decided the rights of a gesta-
tional surrogate pursuant to a surrogate mother contract. For those who oppose commercial
surrogacy in any context, the case sets disturbing precedent. Although the gestational surro-
gate is not biologically related to the child she bears, the situation cannot be so readily
distinguished from the Baby M case. The gestational surrogate arrangement is not exempt
from the dangers indigenous to the more traditional commercial surrogate mother contracts.
As in its traditional counterpart, gestational surrogacy demeans the role of gestation, of
protecting, nurturing and delivering a human child; it fosters the creation of a breeder class
of women whose parental rights can be waived contractually; it promotes the sale of a child
and it may prove psychologically detrimental to the surrogate mother's other children, the
biological parents and the child itself. See infra notes 127-65 and accompanying text.
Although the Johnson case is the first to establish a gestational surrogate's status, a small
but emerging trend toward gestational surrogacy is becoming evident. On July 18 and July
28, 1990, for example, two California women served as gestational surrogates for a Venezue-
lan couple who were unable to have children. After each woman was implanted with four
embryos created by in-vitro fertilization of the wife's eggs and the husband's sperm, one
woman delivered three children and the other then delivered one child. The birth mothers
relinquished the children to the couple in exchange for a fee of $10,000. See Lawson, New
Birth Surrogates Carry Couples' Babies, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1990, at 1.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M left open the possibility that the
New Jersey legislature could alter the statutes within constitutional limits to permit surro-
gacy contracts, the legislature has not done so. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1235. In
May 1990, the New Jersey Bioethics Commission, a state panel established to issue guide-
lines to the legislature on complex health and medical issues, presented a report to the
governor and lawmakers with preliminary recommendations regarding surrogate contracts.
The report suggests that surrogate contracts be deemed illegal and that possible penalties
be applied to strongly discourage the practice. Martello, N.J. Panel Discourages Surrogates,
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effect. During the Baby M trial, state Senator John Dunne intro-
duced legislation in the New York state senate to regulate surro-
gate contracts.9 4 The legislation required strict scrutiny of surro-
gate mothers and mandatory prior approval from the state
superior court for all surrogate parenting contracts. Subsequent to
the Supreme Court decision in Baby M, the bill died, and there
has been no concerted effort to revive it.95
Of more significance is the recent New York Family Court deci-
sion In the Matter of the Adoption of Paul." In this case, the fam-
ily court judge directly disputed the analysis in In re Adoption of
Baby Girl L.J 9 7 of the applicability of New York's baby selling
statutes to the surrogacy contract. The Paul court cited with ap-
proval the analysis and conclusion reached by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Baby M and found the New Jersey court's charac-
terization of the surrogacy contract as "illegal and perhaps
criminal" baby bartering, a compelling one.98
In Paul, the surrogate mother sought judicial consent to the
adoption of her son by the biological father with whose semen she
had been artificially inseminated.9  Despite the obfuscation of the
contract language,:1o the court clearly discerned that the surrogate
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 23, 1990, at B5, col. 1.
On the national level, several bills have been introduced to ban commercial surrogacy
pursuant to the federal government's authority to regulate interstate commerce. Rep.
Thomas Luken (D-Ohio) introduced the first bill, H.R. 275, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989),
which would criminalize commercial surrogacy as would the bill, H.R. 576, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989), sponsored by Rep. Robert Dornan (R-Calif.). On the first anniversary of the
Baby M decision, a bill to ban paid surrogate mother contracts was introduced by Rep.
Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) and Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-rl.). This bill also imposes a criminal
penalty of up to five years in prison and a $50,000 fine, but the penalty is directed solely at
the broker arranging the surrogacy agreement. The bill, moreover, declares a surrogate
mother agreement unenforceable.
94. S. 1429-A (1987).
95. Dunne observed that "the development of a regulatory policy, as opposed to one ad-
vocating prohibition of the practice or nullification of the enforceability of a surrogate
parenting contract, has thus far been the minority perspective." Dunne & Serio, Surrogate
Parenting After Baby M: The Ball Moves to the Legislature's Court, 4 TouRo L. REv. 161,
182 (1988).
96. 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1990).
97. 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1986).
98. 550 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
99. Id. at 815.
100. The contract stated, for example, that the $10,000 payment is not to be construed as
a fee for termination of parental rights or for a consent to surrender the child. Further, the
contract stated that the sole purpose of the conception was to provide a child for the father
without any consideration other than concern for the best interests and welfare of the child.
Id. at 815-16.
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mother was to receive $10,000 in consideration for her surrender of
parental rights. 0 1 Thus, the court deemed it necessary to deter-
mine whether the contract was valid or whether the surrogate must
"foreswear acceptance of the benefit of the bargain and. . assure
this Court that such surrender [was] truly voluntary and [was] mo-
tivated by her concern for the best interests of her child and not
the promise of financial gain."' 2
Observing that none of the proposed legislative bills on surro-
gacy had passed, including that of state senator John Dunne, the
court looked to the state adoption laws for guidance. The court
concluded that remuneration to a mother for surrender of the child
for adoption violates adoption laws and New York's policy against
trafficking in children. 0 3 The court then held it would accept the
surrogate's surrender and termination of parental rights contingent
upon the receipt of sworn affidavits from both parties that no com-
pensation would be proffered or accepted in exchange for the
child. 04
3. International Bodies and Courts of Law
Internationally, the issue of surrogate mother contracts has been
addressed by legislation, case law and governmental reports.' °
Other countries have responded with determinations similar to
those made by the states in this country. Prior to the Baby M deci-
sion, the positions on surrogacy enunciated by various countries or
provinces were not uniform. They were, however, generally critical
of commercial surrogacy. For example, the 1984 study of the Onta-
rio Law Reform Commission recommended legislation to permit
and enforce surrogacy contracts with stringent medical standards
101. Id. at 816.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 817.
104. Id. at 818-19. The decision is also noteworthy for its analysis of the "very significant
difference" between sperm donation and surrogate motherhood:
... [A] sperm is merely a gamete, potentially capable, if successfully joined with an
egg, of creating an embryo which must then survive gestation to birth while the "sur-
rogate" mother is supplying a life-in-being, having provided, not only the egg, but
protection and nourishment during gestation and having delivered a human child ca-
pable of independent survival.
Id. at 818. See supra note 93 (discussion of statutes which broadly define surrogate mothers
to include those mothers who give birth to a child who is not genetically related).
105. See 25 J. FAm. L. 1 (Oct. 1986) (review of legislative and judicial responses to the
issue of surrogacy in Europe).
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and court supervision. 06 In contrast, surrogacy for money was
made a crime via legislation in the Australian state of Victoria in
that same year. 107
Even prior to Baby M, England vehemently opposed commercial
surrogacy. In 1985, the Surrogacy Arrangements Act was passed, to
be applicable throughout the United Kingdom 08 The Act bans
commercial surrogacy and sets forth criminal penalties for in-
termediaries who recruit, advertise and negotiate surrogate mother
arrangements on a commercial basis. 10 9 Surrogates and adoptive
parents are exempt from criminal liability, and private surrogate
arrangements are not illegal." 0
Passage of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act was prompted by a
national furor arising when a British woman, who had been com-
missioned by an American agency to serve as a surrogate, gave
birth in early 1985 to a child for a foreign couple at a fee of
$7,200."' The facts of the surrogacy arrangement became public
when the surrogate mother sold her story to one of Britain's popu-
lar newspapers. 1 2 The child's birth drew the full scrutiny and con-
106. Starke, 63 AusTRALAN L.J. 303 (May 1989) (citing Ontario Law Reform Commission,
Options on Surrogate Motherhood (1984)).
107. Surrogacy: Wrong Mother, Wrong Babies, The Economist 27, 63 (U.S. Ed. Apr. 20,
1985).
108. See 13 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (Mar. 31, 1987) (discussion of Surrogacy Arrange-
ments Act).
109. Id.
110. For example, in March 1987, Sir John Arnold, president of the Family Division, High
Court, permitted a surrogate mother to retain custody of her five month old twins, born as a
result of artificial insemination in a surrogacy arrangement. See Dean, British Surrogate
Mother May Keep Twins, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Mar. 22, 1987, at 8, col. 3. The
surrogate mother had approached the couple directly and offered her services in order to
help them and to provide a better financial future for her family. Id. She changed her mind
after the birth of twins and sought the right to keep them. Id. The court held that the
strong maternal link between the mother and the children should not be broken, irrespec-
tive of the intellectual quality and environment of the couple's home. Id. Moreover, the
court stated that there was nothing shameful in the surrogacy agreement, inasmuch as the
surrogate freely offered herself. Id.
111. The surrogate mother, Kim Cotton, has authored a book in which she unsparingly
reveals the details of the surrogate arrangements and her artificial inseminations. See COT-
TON & WINN, BABY CoTrON-FoR LovF AND MONEY (1985). In an interview, she explained
that she sought the surrogacy arrangement in order to refurbish her home and to serve a
good cause in providing an infertile couple with a child. See Toynbee, How Will Baby Cot-
ton Feel When She Learns That Her Unknown Mother Did Not Give Her Up Sadly, Out
of Necessity, But Gladly For Money, Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 14, 1985, at 19.
112. Kim Cotton was reportedly paid $22,000 by the British tabloid, the Daily Star, to tell
her very public story. The agreement included the guarantee that Cotton would pose for a
photograph where she was kissing the baby after it was born. Id.
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demnation of the press and widespread public disapproval over the
payment of money for a child. The child remained in the hospital
while the High Court determined custody. Justice Latey awarded
custody to the couple, regarding them as a devoted, affluent pair
who would provide a good home. 13 The judge noted that his deci-
sion did not address the moral and ethical implications of the sur-
rogacy issue.' 4
The Federal Republic of Germany has consistently criticized the
surrogate mother contract, premising its objections on both the
commercial aspect of baby bartering and the unlawful private
placement of children for adoption."' In 1985, two German courts
rendered decisions which voided the enforceability of the surrogate
contracts." 6 In the Berlin Court of Appeal, it was held in a case
similar to Baby M that a pre-birth surrender agreement could not
deny the surrogate mother's right to custody of her child." 7 In the
Regional Appeal Court of Hamm, the court faced a surrogate
mother impregnated by her husband, rather than the intended fa-
ther. The court held that the latter was entitled to repayment of
monies paid pursuant to the surrogate contract, as the contract
treated the child as merchandise, and hence was void."'
Subsequent to the Baby M decision, the international arena has
witnessed the promulgation of regulations and recommendations
banning commercial surrogacy. Israel has rendered surrogate
motherhood illegal pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
Health Ministry. Acknowledging the influence of the Baby M case,
113. Stewart, Baby With Price on Head Stirs Outrage Over Surrogate Mothers, Reuters
N. Eur. Serv., Jan. 17, 1985 (NEXIS, REUTER file).
114. Id.
115. "German law strictly limits the institutions that are allowed to arrange adoptions
and forbids this activity to any other group. It objects to surrogacy because this arrange-
ment is a creation of life by a father who wishes a minimum of procreative responsibility
and a mother who wishes a minimum of postbirth responsibility. German law finds this
creation of babies for the purpose of putting them up for private adoption objectionable."
Schwartz, Book Review, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 347, 362 (1989).
116. See 13 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (Mar. 31 1987).
117. Id.
118. More recently, a West German court ordered the closure of a Frankfurt surrogate
motherhood center on the grounds that it violated Germany's adoption laws and social val-
ues. See West German Court Orders Closure of Surrogate Mother Centre, Reuter Libr.
Rep., Jan. 6, 1988 (NEXIS, LBYRPT file). The German surrogate brokerage business de-
nied that its purpose was to promote surrogate motherhood, and instead claimed its purpose
was to offer advice about opportunities for surrogacy in the United States. Id. As noted by
Schwartz, the German agency was a branch of the business of the surrogate broker who
arranged the Baby M contract. See Schwartz, supra note 115, at 361.
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the Ministry deems surrogacy an unethical and unacceptable
practice.11
A forcefully worded report on surrogate motherhood prepared by
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended that
surrogacy contracts be void, that commercial surrogacy be prohib-
ited pursuant to criminal sanctions, that the surrogate mother be
presumed to be the legal mother of the child, and that an adoption
be granted to the commissioning couple only when the child's best
interests mandate such a result.12 0 In language that echoed the ra-
tionale of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M, the-report
stated:
While the Commission has sympathy for this view namely, the pro-
vision of children for the infertile, we regard the disadvantages of
the practice to be so great as to outweigh even the needs of the in-
fertile. We cannot accept that it is in the child's interest to be con-
ceived and born for this purpose. The process denigrates the posi-
tion of women in society and the process of childbirth. It lends
credence to the view that children may be used as a means to an end
and employs the services of professional medical and health care
workers to assist. 12
1
Thus, the legal response of the international community to the sur-
rogate issue has generally been one of advocacy for the prohibition
of commercial surrogacy, for reasons identical to or consistent with
the philosophy enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Baby M.
III. SURROGATE MOTHER CONTRACTS ARE NOT IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, THE MOTHER OR SOCIETY
Confronting her infertility problems, Sarah suggested to her hus-
band Abraham that he cohabit with her slave woman, Hagar, in or-
der that "it may be that I shall be builded up through her."
Genesis 16:2
NEGROES FOR SALE-A Negro woman 24 years of age, and
119. See Health Ministry Regulations, Israel (1988).
120. Starke, supra note 106, at 305 (citing New South Wales Law Reform Commission,
Surrogate Motherhood (1989)).
121. Id. at 304. (emphasis added).
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two children, one eight and the other three years. Said Negroes will
be sold separately or together as desired.
Advertisement cited in J.M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom:
The Civil War Era
Proponents of the surrogate mother contract, endeavoring to
cloak their baby bartering arrangements in the respectability of
antiquity, often refer to the biblical story of Sarah and Abraham as
evidence of the historical precedent it affords. In that story, Sarah
remedies her infertility by having a slave woman, Hagar, serve as a
surrogate mother and give birth to a son Ishmael, although without
a fee and through natural means.122 Sarah later becomes fertile and
gives birth to a son, Isaac."'3 Indeed, a superficial assessment of
this reproductive collaboration would lead one to the conclusion
that the arrangement was an expedient and successful one. A fur-
ther examination reveals, however, that many of the problems at-
tendant to the Baby M situation were present. The story of Hagar,
rather than serving as support for surrogacy, serves instead as an
insight regarding the serious repercussions such a practice entails.
Hagar, a slave, was regarded solely as a gestational instrument
by virtue of her status, as was Mary Beth Whitehead by virtue of
the contract. The Bible indicates that Hagar, once pregnant, was
not content to confine herself to the strictures of her role, in that
she viewed herself as an important figure, proudly proclaiming her
motherhood and thus, alienating Sarah. Similarly, Mary Beth
Whitehead experienced an unforeseen maternal bonding with her
child and found that she could not adhere to the framework of the
contractual terms. The results were disastrous for both: Sarah ulti-
mately ordered the banishment of Hagar and Ishmael"" and Mary
Beth encountered the wrath of the Sterns, the psychiatric experts
and Judge Harvey R. Sorkow. The story of Sarah, Abraham and
Hagar, rather than serving as encouraging precedent, should be
employed as alarming notice to those advocating surrogacy who ar-
gue that the child does not belong to the mother, and who contend
that a surrogate is simply the carrier, or "a postman delivering a
122. Genesis 16:2.
123.. Genesis 21:2.
124. Genesis 16:6.
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very special parcel.' 1 25 The story of Hagar illustrates that surro-
gacy encompasses unforeseen consequences and that the price to
be borne by the child, mother, and society, in order to satisfy the
need of an infertile couple, may be enormous.
One of the costs of surrogate mother contracts to the child and
the natural mother is an enduring psychological harm, which may
be incurred as a result of the severance of parental ties. Courts
have long recognized the severity of the harm sustained by parents
associated with relinquishment of parental rights. Numerous deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court have established the
fundamental parental right to continued companionship, care, cus-
tody and management of the child 2 6 and the grievous loss suffered
by the severance of those parental ties. 12
7
In Meyer v. Nebraska,2 s the Court held that the rights of par-
ents to maintain ties with their children is "a privilege long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness.' 12 9 In May v. Anderson,'10 the Court stated that parental
rights are "far more precious. . . than property rights.' 3 ' Finally,
in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,'32 the Court stated
that termination of parental ties with children imposes "a unique
kind of deprivation" and that a "parent's interest in the accuracy
and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status
is, therefore, a commanding one.' 3 3 Moreover, Justice Stevens in
the Lassiter dissent regarded the loss of a parental relationship
with a child as more grievous than the loss of personal liberty by
incarceration.13 4 Dissenting Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Mar-
125. Majendie, Surrogate Mother Motivated by Both Love and Money, Reuters N. Eur.
Serv., July 18, 1985 (NEXIS, REUTER file) (quoting British surrogate Kim Cotton).
126. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
127. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
128. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
129. Id. at 399.
130. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
131. Id. at 533.
132. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). In this case, the United States Supreme Court held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not mandate appointment of counsel to an
indigent parent in every parental status termination proceeding, even though the parent's
interest is an extremely important one. Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall joined in
dissenting vociferously, as did Justice Stevens, individually, noting that the unique impor-
tance of a parent's interest in the care and custody of his or her child cannot constitution-
ally be terminated unless accompanied by representation of counsel, as mandated by the
due process clause.
133. Id. at 27.
134. Id. at 59.
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shall observed that the interest of a parent in his or her child "oc-
cupies a unique place in our legal culture" and that parental rights
are "more significant and priceless than 'liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements.' 1'5 The New Jersey
courts have similarly held that "it is difficult to consider many con-
sequences of greater magnitude than the loss of one's children. '" 13 6
Psychological studies addressing surrender of a child for adop-
tion uniformly conclude that the consequences to a mother who
surrenders a child can be severe. Contrary to the assumption that
the birth mother forgets the child and commences a new life,137
studies have documented that the women experience grief, mourn-
ing, and a sense of loss that persists for periods up to thirty years
or longer. 3 s The research suggests this sense of loss experienced by
the birth mothers, is similar to that of women who experience the
death of a baby prior to, or after birth. e13 The mothers react to the
loss of their children as if they had lost a part of themselves. 140
Moreover, the studies demonstrate that mothers who relinquish
children to adoption confront serious social problems, encompass-
ing difficulties such as marital dysfunction and infertility.'M  The
surrogate mother contract and its accompanying relinquishment of
the child encompass minimally the same risk of harm to the
mother.
135. Id. at 38 (citations omitted).
136. Crist v. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 416 (1974),
afl'd, 135 N.J. Super. 573 (App. Div. 1975).
137. Pannor, Baran & Sorosky, Birth-parents Who Relinquished Babies for Adoption
Revisited, 17 FAMILY PROCESS 329, 331 (1978).
138. SOR0SKY, BARAN & PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE (1978); WINKLER & VAN KP-
PEL, RELINQUISHING MOTHERS IN ADOPTION (1984). The Winkler study involved approxi-
mately 2,000 Australian women who had relinquished a first child for adoption and later
experienced a negative and enduring sense of loss for periods of up to 30 years. A further
study concerned with the ramifications of relinquishment by the mother indicated that birth
mothers who surrender experienced:
recurring dreams concerning the loss of the baby, with cobtrasting themes of trau-
matic separation and joyful reunion being most common, and they all experienced an
involuntary curiosity, when seeing a stranger with a small baby, about whether this
was the baby they had relinquished. When there was "enough" physical resemblance
to support this slim and desperate possibility, they would follow the baby as if to
visually retrieve it.
Rynearson, Relinquishment and its Maternal Complications: A Preliminary Study, 139 AM
J. PSYCHIATRY 338, 339-40 (1982).
139. See WINKLER & VAN KEPPEL, supra note 138.
140. Id.
141. Deykin, Campbell & Patti, The Post-Adoption Experience of Surrendering Parents,
54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 271, 276 (1984).
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Increasingly, courts are recognizing that the severance of paren-
tal ties impacts negatively upon the child as well. As observed by
the New Jersey Superior Court in a recent decision involving ter-
mination of parental rights,
A final separation from a biological parent is a harm in itself...
[the child] would feel a sense of loss if her relationship with her
natural mother was terminated. Experts are increasingly concerned
about the seriousness of this loss and are recognizing the need for
continued contact with a biological parent, even a flawed parent.142
The trial court in Baby M failed to recognize that the unnecessary
separation of a child from its natural parent is inimical to the best
interests of a child. 143 In another New Jersey Supreme Court case
In re Adoption of Children by D., the court refused to permit ter-
mination of a natural father's parental rights in favor of adoption
by a stepfather. The court stated that "[t]he child's relationship
with the parent is of such significance that all doubts are to be
resolved against its destruction.' 1 44 The New Jersey Superior
Court has stated, "the child's profound need to know who her par-
ents are, where they came from, the conditions under which they
could not take care of her, is not addressed by the [existence of] a
psychological parent."'14 5
The courts' recognition that the child's best interest is served by
maintaining a relationship with a natural parent is consistent with
psychological studies that show adoptees confront psychological
risks of harm. Several studies indicate that adoptees are more
prone to psychopathology than other members of the population,
and that they, therefore, are commonly seen in consultation and
treatment.14 Common problems experienced by adoptees include
low self-esteem and insecurity resulting from the severance from
the natural parent, as well as identity and genealogical confu-
142. In re J.E.D., 217 N.J. Super. 1, -, 524 A.2d 1255, 1262 (App. Div. 1987).
143. See Sorentino v. Family and Children's Soc., 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18 (1977); In re
Adoption by J.J.P., 175 N.J. Super. 420, 419 A.2d 1135 (App. Div. 1980).
144. 61 N.J. 89, , 293 A.2d 171, 173 (1972).
145. In re J.E.D., 217 N.J. Super. at -, 524 A.2d at 1262-63 (citing Fanshel, 12 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 501, 503 (1983-84)).
146. Blotcky, Looney & Grace, Treatment of the Adopted Adolescent: Involvement of
the Biologic Mother, 21 J. Am. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 281 (1982); Simon & Senturia,
Adoption and Psychiatric Illness, 122 Aid J. PSYCHIATRY 858 (1966); Nickman, Losses in
Adoption: The Need for Dialogue, 40 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 365 (1985).
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sion. 117 It is significant to note that several studies conclude the
child experiences these problems even where the child is separated
from only one natural parent and is raised by the other.148
The child of a surrogate mother arrangement will suffer not only
the harms indigenous to the severance of parental ties in the adop-
tion situation, but will also confront a risk of harm unique to the
surrogacy contract.14 As the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby
M noted:
The long-term effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, but
feared-the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that
she is the offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to obtain
money; the impact on the natural mother as the full weight of her
isolation is felt along with the full reality of the sale of her body and
her child; the impact on the natural father and adoptive mother
once they realize the consequences of their conduct.1 50
Surrogate mother contracts pose an additional risk of grievous
harm to the child born of such an arrangement: the risk of rejec-
tion by both the natural mother and the biological father. That
horrifying prospect has, in fact, already occurred. In January 1983,
a surrogate mother, Judy Stiver, gave birth to a child afflicted with
a severe congenital disorder. The contracting father, Alexander
Malahoff, disclaimed paternity and refused to assume responsibil-
ity for the child's care. A paternity test determined that Mr. Stiver
was the father of the child.' 5 ' Mr. Malahoff has now commenced
suit against Mrs. Stiver for breach of contract and the Stivers have
filed claims, asserting that Mr. Malahoff invaded their privacy by
147. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Adoption and the Adolescent: An Overview, 5 ADOLES-
CENT PSYCHATRY 54 (1977); Nickman, supra note 146.
148. See SOROSKY, BARAN & PANNOR, supra note 138; McKUEN, FINDING MY FATHER: ONE
MAN'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 14 (1976); amici brief submitted by American Adoption Con-
gress in Baby M. Further, the growing movement for open adoption records clearly reflects
the adoptees' need to know about their origins. SOROSKY, BARAN & PANNOR supra note 138,
at 155-56.
149. In adoption, one can accept that the severance of parental ties with the mother is
intended to resolve a difficult situation, and the focus is clearly on what is best for the child
and the natural mother. In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 425, 537 A.2d 1227, 1242
(1988). Surrogacy, in contrast, purposefully creates the severance of the mother and child
relationship, gives little thought to the psychological repercussions for mother and child,
and directs its focus to the needs of the biological father and his wife.
150. Id. at 441, 537 A.2d at 1250.
151. Stiver and Malahoff appeared on "The Phil Donahue Show" where the results of the
paternity tests were announced.
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publicizing the incident and that the child's condition was caused
by a virus transmitted by Malahoff's sperm.152 Surrogacy is a situa-
tion, notes one commentator, where the usual assumption of re-
sponsibility for procreative choices is not applicable.' 3 Parental ir-
responsibility is inherent in a situation where a sperm donor orders
a child from a woman with whom he has no intention of accepting
parenthood; the woman becomes pregnant with an intention of
surrendering her child.5 As observed by another commentator:
The birth of a handicapped infant can be traumatic for the most
devoted loving parents. Disappointment, denial and grief may make
it difficult for any parent to respond to the needs of the child. When
a handicapped infant is borne into a family, however, emotional or
custodial abandonment are generally not considered to be options
.,.. surrogacy arrangements increase the risk that biological parents
will feel it is acceptable to abandon infants after they have been
born.15 5
This parental lack of accountability may also be provoked when
a child does not meet the buyer's expectations.156 But as one com-
mentator observes, this danger of parental irresponsibility is "al-
ways present in a surrogacy arrangement. When babies are ordered
in the way that expensive products are, they may be treated more
like objects than like developing beings with their own needs."' 57
152. See Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies,
70 A.B.A.J. 50, 56 (Aug. 1984).
153. Schwartz, supra note 115, at 364.
154. Id.
155. Areen, Handicapped Child Becomes Damaged Goods, 121 N.J.L.J. 317-18 (1988).
156. See Rejected Boy's Twin Sister Now Also With Surrogate Mother, L.A. Times, May
27, 1988, at 2, col. 4. In this instance, a surrogate mother gave birth to twins, a boy and a
girl, pursuant to a $10,000 contract. The contracting couple refused to accept the boy saying
a doctor had counseled against adding more than one child to their family because of added
stress. Although the couple did initially take the girl, the surrogate mother assumed custody
of both children.
157. Schwartz, supra note 115 (citing Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern Family:
A Proposed- Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1304 (1983)). See also In
the Matter of the Adoption of Tessa Annaleah Reams, 52 Ohio App. 3d 52, 55 N.E.2d 159
(1989). In this case, the surrogate mother could not become pregnant from the commission-
ing father's sperm so she was artificially inseminated with the sperm from another man, not
her husband. The case illustrates the complexities of determining parental responsibility in
surrogate situations, especially when, as here, the commissioning couple divorced, and each
sought custody of the child. The mother of the child has also brought an action seeking
permanent custody. Ohio ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Solove, 52 Ohio St. 3d 6, 556
N.E.2d 439 (1990).
Another argument that has been raised regarding the sale and purchase of children is that
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The surrogate mother contract makes commodities of children
and mothers, reducing children to the status of sought after goods
and mothers into the requisite means to satisfy the need of men
and their infertile wives to procreate. From a historical perspec-
tive, surrogate mother contracts represent a regression for both
women and children into the past common law era when both
women and children were deemed chattel-property of the husband
and father.158 The father, in a case of separation or divorce, re-
ceived custody of the child irrespective both of his own character
and of the welfare of the child.' 59 The mother in accordance with
the Aristotelian theory of human reproduction was merely the
"passive incubator of his seed"' 60 or, in Judge Sorkow's view, the
"means of reproduction."'' Even married women had no rights to
the custody and companionship of their children until the late
19th century.6 2 The common law era afforded mothers some stat-
such a contract is void under the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
which declares that neither slavery or involuntary servitude shall exist within any part of
the United States. The trial court judge in Baby M refuted the applicability of the thir-
teenth amendment to the Whitehead-Stern contract, stating that Mr. Stem was not paying
for the surrender of the child, but rather Whitehead's willingness to be impregnated and
carry his child to term. In the Matter of Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, -, 525 A.2d 1128,
1157 (Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). See
also amici Brief of Odyssey Inst. Int'l, Inc., (filed in the appeal of Baby M, which argued
that the Whitehead-Stern surrogate mother contract was for the sale and purchase of a
child, and hence void under the thirteenth amendment). Commentators have noted that the
slavery analogy is a telling one. Specific enforcement of surrogacy contracts results in the
involuntary destruction of family units, which is what many Americans deemed most repul-
sive about slavery prior to the Civil War. See Annas, supra note 35, at 30; Smith, Wombs
for Rent, Selves for Sale? 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLIcY 23, 33-34 (1988); Stone, Neos-
lavery-'Surrogate' Motherhood Contracts v. The Thirteenth Amendment, 6 L. & INEQUAL-
iTy 63, 73 (1988). See also Doe v. Keane, 658 F. Supp. 216 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (where a
surrogate mother whose child suffered a premature birth and subsequent death, alleged in-
ter alia, that defendant Noel Keane's acts violated the thirteenth amendment. The claim
was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the thir-
teenth amendment does not allow for independent, private causes of action.
158. See supra note 45 (discussion of parental rights to children) see also SACHS & WIL-
SON, SEXISM AND THE LAW, 149 (1979); WORTMAN, I WOMEN IN AMERIcAN LAW, 64 (1st ed.
1985).
159. WORTMAN, supra note 158.
160. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
161. 217 N.J. Super. at -, 525 A.2d at 1164. This view of a surrogate mother as a gesta-
tional instrument comports with the fictional vision of the future in The Handmaid's Tale
(1986) by Margaret Atwood. In the book, a select group of women, the handmaidens, are
chosen to be surrogate mothers and are compelled to produce children for others, based on
Biblical precedent. The natural mother, who loses all rights to her child at birth, states: "We
are containers, it's only the inside of our bodies that are important." ATWOOD, THE HAND-
MAID'S TALE 96 (1986). See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussion of women's rights to the cus-
tody of their children).
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ure with regard to their relationships with men, in that the prevail-
ing cultural ideology concluded that the role of mother was a noble
one, essential to the well being of society.16 3 Now, long after the
Mendelian genetic science has clarified the equal genetic contribu-
tions men and women make to human reproduction, the surrogate
mother contract would deem a surrogate only a substitute uterus
and "not the mother but someone who carried the child." 16,4 Repro-
ductive engineers, observes one commentator, will turn procreation
into a commodity wherein women are used for the fruit that they
bear.165
Surrogate mother contracts serve to deny women rights to their
children's custody and companionship, deny the child the right to
a continued relationship with the natural mother, contemptuously
denigrate and demean the role of mother, affording her no recogni-
tion of her contributions, her effort or her significance to the child,
and deny the humanity of those involved. Surrogate mother con-
tracts, indeed, serve no one but the broker and the buyer, at a cost
which should not be borne by any society.
IV. CONCLUSION
The underlying thrust of adoption laws and termination of pa-
rental rights statutes is a recognition that the interests of the child
and the mother must be considered to be of primary importance.
The maintenance of the parental tie with the natural parent is
deemed in the best interests of the child, irrespective of the
mother's socioeconomic status or level of mastery of parenting
skills. The loss of.parental rights is acknowledged in the law as one
more grievous than the loss of freedom. The surrogate mother con-
tract, whose very name serves to denigrate the mother and reduce
her to a gestational instrument, skews these priorities and focuses
solely on the need of the commissioning couple. It disregards the
best interests of the child; it is indifferent to the deprivation exper-
ienced by the mother. The termination of parental rights has been
163. See CONWAY, THE FEMALE EXPERIENCE IN 18TH AND 19TH CENTURY AMERICA 35, 116
(1985); see also DORENKAMP, McCLYMER, MOYNIHAN & VADUM, IMAGES OF WOMEN IN AMERI-
CAN POPULAR CULTURE 2-3 (1985).
164. See 120 N.J.L.J. 330 Aug. 13, 1987). (The Sterns' lawyer in Baby M, Gary N. Skoloff,
scoffed at the argument raised by a New York law school professor that the thirteenth
amendment should apply to surrogacy cases, "insisting that Whitehead was not the mother,
but someone who carried the child.")
165. ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 187 (1983).
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characterized by one member of the New Jersey Supreme Court as
a fundamental, cosmic issue. The surrogate mother contract ac-
cords it no more sensitivity than the transfer of title of a product
from a seller to the buyer.
The thrust of the prohibitions against baby selling is to recog-
nize the essential integrity of a human being, and that no need of
the buyer, however compelling, can justify such a denigration of
human dignity. Surrogacy arrangements mask their true intentions
via the employment of obfuscatory language which maintains a
pretense of purchasing services rather than buying a baby.
The only needs addressed by the surrogacy mother contract are
the need of an infertile couple to have progeny and the need of a
broker to have a profit. No need, pain, or desire of infertile
couples, however intensely felt, however understandable, can jus-
tify the denigration of children and mothers, the purposeful blur-
ring of distinctions between people and products, the denial of
profound issues about human relationships, the blatant disregard
of the best interests of children and their mothers, the infliction of
such grievous harm upon others, and the destruction of the rights
of others. There are, indeed, some things which money cannot
buy.166
166. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 440, 537 A.2d at 1249.
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